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First, we investigate whether the behavior of the U.S. current account behavior is anomalous in 
light of previous industrial country experience. Second, we determine whether East Asian current 
account balances are predictable using standard macroeconomic variables, augmented with 
institutional factors. Finally, we investigate whether higher levels of financial development in 
key East Asian economies would result in smaller current account surpluses. We find that a one 
percentage-point increase in the budget balance would increase the current account balance by 
0.10 to 0.49 percentage-points for industrialized countries, and that the U.S. current account 
performance over the last four years is borderline anomalous. While more developed financial 
markets would lead to smaller current account balances for countries with highly developed legal 
systems and open financial markets, for key East Asian countries, greater financial development 
would cause higher saving. Asian current account surpluses seem to be driven by depressed 
investment, not excess saving.  
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1.  Introduction 
The development of enormous and persistent current account imbalances over the past decade has been 
the topic of intense debate in academic and policy circles. The 2004 U.S. current account to GDP deficit of 5.7 
percentage points is unprecedented by historical standards, and high in comparison to other developed 
economies. 
A number of explanations have been forwarded for this phenomenon. At the risk of over-simplification, 
the explanations can be categorized as either domestic or international in nature. Some argue that the main 
reason for the increase in U.S. current account imbalances is the decline in U.S. saving, especially public sector 
saving, since 2002. In this “twin deficits” argument, the current Administration’s expansionary fiscal policy 
bears the greatest blame. Greenspan (2005a,b), Ferguson (2004) and others have, on the other hand, argued that 
the impact of fiscal policy on the current account balance is small.  
A “global saving glut” explanation has been expounded by Bernanke (2005), Clarida (2005a,b), and 
Hubbard (2005). This argument views excess saving from Asian emerging market countries, driven by rising 
saving and collapsing investment in the aftermath of the financial crisis (and to a lesser extent Europe), as the 
cause of the U.S. current account deficit. More recently, the burgeoning surpluses of the oil exporters, ranging 
from the Persian Gulf countries to Russia, have moved to the fore as sources of excess saving. From this 
perspective, the U.S. external imbalance is a problem made abroad, and amenable to a solution only in the 
longer term, as better developed and more open financial systems mitigate this excess saving problem.  
Surprisingly, despite the popularity of the saving conjecture in American policy circles, there has been 
little empirical work that takes seriously the global saving glut theses.1 In this paper, we remedy this deficiency 
by analyzing the determinants of current account balances for industrial and developing countries, while 
controlling for differences in institutional environment across countries. The data set we employ covers a large 
and heterogeneous group of countries (19 industrial, 70 developing) over a relatively long time span (1971-
2004).  
                                                 
1 One exception is Gruber and Kamin (2005). Roughly contemporaneously with us, they have written a paper closely 




Our empirical approach relies upon the methodology developed by Chinn and Prasad (2003). Their 
study provided a broad empirical characterization of the medium-term determinants of current account balances 
for a sample of industrial and developing countries from the perspective of longer-run saving-investment 
balances. This paper updates and extends their work by incorporating a potentially important factor identified by 
Bernanke (2005), namely the effects of legal and institutional development.  
Whether one takes the twin deficits or global saving glut argument, the effect of legal and institutional 
development cannot be dismissed a priori. In addition to macroeconomic attributes such as the stage of 
development, the demographic profile, and the government budget balance, the legal environment and the level 
of institutional development should also be important determinants for saving and investment decisions since 
they affect the rate of returns from these activities.  
The extent of institutional development should enhance the effectiveness of financial development and 
other policy measures such as financial opening. Hence, this paper also devotes special attention to the effect of 
financial development and examine whether the “financial deepening” argument (Edwards, 1996) or the saving 
glut argument is applicable for sample countries’ saving determination. In this regard, we estimate a model that 
controls for financial deepening and interacts it with other variables such as institutional development and 
financial openness. With regard to the saving glut hypothesis, we investigate whether the recent current account 
imbalances of the United States and emerging market countries in East Asia can be explained by the 
development in asset markets.  
The key findings are as follows. The budget balance is an important determinant of the current account 
balance for industrial countries; the coefficient for the budget balance variable is 0.15 in a model controlling for 
institutional variables. A series of robustness checks yield the results that a one percent point increase in the 
budget balance (above the world weighted average) should lead to a 0.1 to 0.5 percentage point increase in the 
current account balance. For the United States, our analysis confirms the view that it is a saving drought – not 
investment boom – that is contributing to the enlargement of current account deficits, although there is some 
evidence of anomalous behaviour in the latest four year period. 
                                                                                                                                                                       




For the East Asian countries, we find some evidence that the budget balances are somewhat larger than 
predicted by our empirical models. However, we also find that the data are not consistent with the argument that 
the more developed financial markets are, the less saving a country undertakes. For these countries, the reverse 
is true: More financial development leads to higher saving. In this context, there is no evidence of “excess 
domestic saving” in the East Asian emerging market countries. Rather they appear to be suffering from an 
investment drought over the post-crisis period.  
2. Is the U.S. Current Account Imbalance Extraordinary? 
2.1  Theoretical Framework and Data 
We estimate regressions of the general form: 
titititi uZBXy ,,,, +Γ++= α         (1) 
where y is either the current account balance, national saving, or investment, all expressed as a share of GDP, X 
is a vector of macroeconomic and policy variables such as net foreign assets and the budget surplus, and Z is a 
vector of financial development factors, all except net foreign assets expressed relative to the global mean. The 
choice of the first set of variables follows Chinn and Prasad (2003), while that of the second set is inspired by 
the literature on financial development as surveyed by Chinn and Ito (2006). The idea that financial 
development might drive, and interact with, growth to influence saving and investment behavior is extensively 
discussed in the finance and growth literature. Levine (2005) reviews this vast literature. 
One potential problem with developing country data is the possibility of significant measurement error 
in annual data. To mitigate these concerns, and since our interest is primarily in medium-term rather than short-
term variations in current accounts, we construct a panel that contains non-overlapping 5-year averages of the 
data for each country.2  This procedure also has the advantage of abstracting from short-run variations in current 
accounts and related variables, which are not of central interest.   
The variables we incorporate into the analysis are the following: 
Net foreign assets to GDP ratio: From an intertemporal perspective, the stock of net foreign assets 
                                                                                                                                                                       
(2005) and the Economist (2005). 




(NFA) serves as an important initial condition, given that the current account is the sum of the trade balance and 
the return on a country’s stock of NFA (or payment on its net foreign liabilities position). Alternatively, from a 
buffer stock saving perspective, higher levels of initial net foreign assets should be associated with subsequent 
lower current account balances. 
Government budget surplus to GDP ratio: A variety of models predict a positive relationship between 
government budget balances and current accounts over the medium term. In the absence of a full Ricardian 
offset via private saving, an increase in the government budget balance could lead to an increase in national 
saving. In developing economies, where a greater proportion of agents may be liquidity constrained, this 
relationship might be expected to be more pronounced.  
Relative income: The “stages of development” hypothesis for the balance of payments suggests that 
countries, as they move from a low to an intermediate stage of development, typically import capital and, 
therefore, run current account deficits. As they reach an advanced stage of development, countries run current 
account surpluses in order to pay off accumulated external liabilities and also to export capital to less advanced 
economies.  
Demographics: The literature on the determinants of national saving has pointed to a number of 
additional “structural” determinants such as demographics. Masson et al. (1998) show that the dependency ratio 
is one of the key determinants of private saving.  
Uncertainty: Terms of trade volatility is another potential determinant of medium-term fluctuations in 
current accounts. Agents in economies that face more volatile terms of trade might save more for precautionary 
reasons in order to smooth their consumption streams in the face of volatile income flows.  
Trade Openness: Country characteristics that reflect macroeconomic policies could also be relevant for 
current account determination. The degree of openness to international trade could reflect policy choices, 
including tariff regimes.  
Growth Rates: Countries with high labor productivity growth may attract more capital inflows with 
higher expected rates of returns in their asset markets, as has been argued to be the case with the U.S. whose 
buoyant labor productivity growth may have been the main cause of the recent rise in current account deficits. 
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As a proxy to productivity growth, we include real output growth rates.3 
Financial Development/Deepening: A large body of literature has identified the positive effect of development 
in financial instruments, markets, and institutions – or financial development or deepening – on economic 
growth (see Levine (2005) for a comprehensive review). That is, financial development enhances saving and 
investment because it contributes to raising returns as well as lowering the cost of capital and the risk of 
investment by ameliorating information asymmetry, reducing information and transaction cost, improving 
corporate governance, and/or facilitating risk management (King and Levine, 1993, Rajan and Zingales, 1998, 
Wurgler, 2000). Hence, it is important to consider financial development/deepening as one of the determinants 
for the saving and investment decision.  
While the effect of financial development on investment is unambiguous (i.e., positive), that on saving 
is not, because higher returns and lower risk of financial investment create effects on saving akin to income and 
substitution effects. The traditional view on the effect of financial development on saving suggests a positive 
association between the two variables; further financial deepening could induce more saving through more depth 
and sophistication of the financial system. However, a contrasting view suggests that more developed financial 
markets lessen the need for precautionary saving, and thereby lower the saving rate. 
Bernanke (2005) argues that greater financial development will remedy the global saving glut in the 
long run by inducing a decline in the saving rate in the emerging Asia. Similarly, Clarida (2005a,b) argues that 
the sophisticated equity markets in the U.S. absorb excess saving from all over the world, leading to higher 
current account deficits. Given these arguments, we believe that financial market development must be taken 
seriously in any empirical examination of the saving glut hypothesis. 
To measure financial development, we use private credit as a ratio to GDP (PCGDP) whose data are 
drawn from Beck, et al. (2001 and updates).4,5 Also, we measure the level of financial development using the 
                                                 
3 Details regarding data sources and construction are contained in the Data Appendix. 
4 One might also consider equity market development as well. While the dataset of Beck, et al. also contains data to 
measure the development in equity markets  -- namely, stock market capitalization (SMKC), total value of stocks traded 
(SMTV), and stock market turn over ratio (SMTO) --  it is extremely difficult to rely upon these measures as indicators of 
equity market development since one cannot clearly distinguish between bubble behavior and actual market development. 
Therefore, we do not include equity market development measures in our estimation. However, we will still examine the 
effect of equity market development using these measures in work reported in the working paper version. 
5 We use PCGDP, while Chinn and Prasad’s (2003) use M2 to GDP, primarily for data availability reasons. 
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level of private credit creation as the deviation from the world weighted average. By measuring the level of 
financial development in relative terms, we believe that we can examine the effect of financial development for 
both creditor and debtor countries and test whether the saving glut or financial deepening view is applicable. 
That is, a negative correlation between the overall effect of further financial development and current account or 
saving suggests that countries with underdeveloped (well-developed) financial markets are creditor (debtor) 
countries and export their excess capital to the rest of the world (import excess capital from abroad) and run 
current account surplus (deficit) – the saving glut argument. A positive correlation, on the other hand, is more 
consistent with the conventional financial deepening argument. 
All the variables, except for net foreign assets to GDP, are converted into the deviations from their 
GDP-weighted world mean prior to the calculation of five year averages. The demeaning of the data series 
controls for rest-of-world effects. In other words, a country’s current account balance is determined by 
developments at home as well as abroad.  
2.2 Empirical Results: Do Budget Balances Matter? 
The sample for our analysis covers both industrial and developing countries. The underlying database 
has annual data for 19 industrial and 70 developing countries covering the period 1971-2004. In this part of the 
analysis, we focus upon the industrial country data. 
Table 1 shows a significantly positive relationship between current account and government budget 
balances for all the sample groups. A one percentage point increase (above the world GDP-weighted average) in 
the budget balance would lead to a 0.16 percentage point increase in the current account balance for 
industrialized countries (IDC), a different result from Chinn and Prasad (2003), who examined a shorter sample 
from 1971 to 1995. For purposes of comparison, we also report estimated coefficients for the less developed 
countries and those excluding African countries.6 The corresponding parameter for non-African less developed 
countries (ex-Africa LDC) is 0.24, suggesting that it is important to disaggregate the sample along the 
                                                 
6 As can be seen in the table, inclusion of the latter countries makes the empirical results sensitive. Therefore, we report 
separate sets of results with and without the African countries included for the developing country sample. 
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industrial/developing country dimension.7  
One noteworthy aspect of Table 1 relates to the financial deepening variable. In the industrial countries’ 
current account regressions, it exhibits a negative, although statistically insignificant, coefficient. In contrast, 
this coefficient is positive in the less developed country regressions. With these results, one may very well 
question the proposition that more developed financial markets lead to decreased current account balances, as 
posited by the adherents of the global saving glut thesis.8 
One attribute of pooled OLS is that one imposes the restriction that the effect of a change in a given 
right hand side variable has the same cross-country effect as within-country. That is, if the budget balance were 
to increase in a given country, the effect over time would be quantitatively the same as between countries. This 
restriction can be relaxed by using a fixed effects specification.9  
The most interesting finding is that the coefficient on the government budget balance rises to 0.38 for 
industrial countries, and is significant at the 1% marginal significance level (see Table 2 for comparison). Based 
on the results from the national saving to GDP regression (not reported), we know that the effect mainly comes 
from a “non-Ricardian” improvement in the level of national saving, which is found only in the industrial 
country subgroup.10  
It is important to carefully interpret this statistical result. It means that, given country-specific 
characteristics, a 1 percentage point increase in the budget surplus to GDP ratio in, for instance the U.S., would 
result in a roughly 0.4 percentage point improvement in the current account balance. This number is 
substantially higher than estimates reported in Gruber and Kamin (2005) and cited by Ferguson (2005). On the 
other hand, the fixed effects estimates are difficult to use to determine the “normal” current account balance, to 
the extent that a country’s fixed effect is a reflection of the effects not captured by the variables included in the 
regression. 
                                                 
7 Homogeneity of all coefficients was rejected for all pairs of subsamples, confirming heterogeneity of saving-investment 
determinations among subgroups of countries. 
8 In the saving regressions (not reported), all the sample groups except for the industrial country group have significantly 
positive coefficients for the financial deepening variable. This issue will be examined more carefully in a later section. 
9 We drop the variables that have no time variation – terms of trade volatility and the openness indicator. 
10 Such non-Ricardian effect is also found in emerging market countries, a subgroup of the less developed country group 




Another interesting finding is that the estimated coefficient on the financial development variable 
(PCGDP) is now significantly negative for the industrialized and emerging market groups in both the current 
account and national saving regressions (not reported), consistent with the Bernanke’s conjecture, indicating that 
once cross-country differences are controlled for, more developed financial markets lead to decreased current 
account balances. Presumably, this effect occurs through the reduction in national saving due to more efficient 
allocation of financial resources and thereby reduced need for precautionary saving, although our analysis 
cannot confirm that. Interestingly, this effect is detected only for higher income countries. 
2.3 Robustness Checks 
Clearly, all the variables involved in our analysis are to one degree or another endogenous. Hence, one 
has to worry about simultaneity bias. One particularly plausible source of simultaneity can arise from the 
possible feedback of the current account balance on government budget balances (through tax receipts or 
government spending, for instance). To guard against this possibility, we undertake a series of robustness tests. 
First, we implement two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation instrumenting the budget balance variable with 
selected variables. The instruments include the dummy for the left-wing government (LEFT); military spending 
as a ratio to GDP (MILEXP); yearly changes in unemployment rates (D_U); and regional dummies.11 The 
estimation results are shown in Table 2, in which we only show estimated coefficients on budget balances for 
different model specifications. Rows (2) and (3) show the results from the 2SLS estimation.12 When compared 
to the results from the OLS estimation, the magnitudes of the estimates (in absolute value) are mostly larger, 
                                                                                                                                                                       
significant deterioration of investment for all subgroups except for the industrial country group, signifying the non-
Ricardian effect on current account unique for the latter group. 
11 The military spending ratio is not included as an instrument in the regressions for industrial countries because it turned 
out to be insignificant in the first stage regression. The interaction between the left-wing government dummy and the 
change the unemployment rate is included in the IDC regressions to capture the left-wing government’s reaction to change 
in the unemployment rate. In the LDC and EMG regressions, on the other hand, while the military spending variable is 
included, neither the unemployment rate change variable nor its interaction with the left-wing government dummy is 
included due to their statistical insignificance. The rationale for using these instruments follows the past literature on the 
determinants of budget balances such as Roubini (1991), Roubini and Sachs (1989a, b), Persson and Tabellini (2001), and 
Braconier and Holden (2004). The definitions and sources of the instruments can be found in Data Appendix. In addition to 
the variables mentioned in the text, we also tested the dummy for countries with plural political systems; government 
fragmentation (both from DPI 2004); political constraint, or democracy, index (from Henisz, 2000); and the standard 
deviation of tax revenues (following Talvi and Vegh, 2005). These variables turned out to be insignificant, and were 
thereby not included as instruments.  
12 In the next section, we will also examine the effect of institutional development such as the level of legal development 




while the degree of statistical significance remains essentially unchanged, or greater. 
Second, we estimate the regressions using data sampled at an annual frequency, using HP-detrended 
series for the variables that exhibit business cycles variation – namely, the budget balance, net foreign asset, 
relative income, output growth, and financial deepening (PCGDP) to control for business cycles effects. While 
sampling five-year period averages should mitigate the effect of business cycles, this might not be sufficient. We 
apply OLS and the fixed effects model to the detrended data. The results are displayed in rows (4), (5), and (6) 
in Table 2, respectively. Since estimation errors using annual panel data may involve serial correlation, we also 
estimate the model using feasible GLS. Those results, without and with institutional variables and corresponding 
interaction terms, are reported in rows (7) and (8), respectively.  
The magnitude and statistical significance of the estimates coefficients are largely consistent with what 
we have found in the previous analyses. A one percent point increase in the budget balance leads to a 0.10 to 
0.49 percentage point increase in the current account balances, and a 0.17 to 0.81 percentage point increase in 
national saving. We can safely conclude that an improvement in the government budget balance does improve 
current account balances for industrialized countries, and that the improvement is mainly achieved through an 
improvement in national saving. 
Does this set of results make sense? Between 2000 and 2005, there was approximately a 4.3 percentage 
point swing in the Federal budget balance, and a 2.2 percentage point swing in the current account balance. This 
outcome is consistent with a 0.5 coefficient.13  
2.4 In-sample and Out-of-sample Fit 
We next investigate whether the pattern of current account imbalances observed over the past decade is atypical. 
One way to examine the alignment of current account balances is to see the predicted values based on the 
estimation results. Figure 1 displays the implied current account balances for the United States along with 95% 
prediction intervals that are calculated using the estimation results shown in Table 1. Figure 1 indicates that the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
specifications “with” and “without” institutional variables. The effect of these variables will be carefully discussed in a later 
section. 
13 Data sourced from pages 1, 34, 36 of the August Economic Indicators (jointly published by CEA and JEC). The GDP 




U.S. current account deviated from the predicted path in the last two periods while such consistent deviation is 
not observed in other countries or country group. Given that the 2001-04 observation is just outside the ±2 
standard error band, there is some indication that something is omitted from the model. In a similar vein, Gruber 
and Kamin (2005) also find an unexplained component in the most recent few years. 
Another way to explore this question is to conduct out-of-sample predictions for the 1996-2000 and 
2001-04 periods using the estimated coefficients from the regressions implemented over the 1971-95 time 
periods.14 We implement two models, one with only the Chinn-Prasad macro variables and one augmented with 
other institutional variables (described in the next section), and compare these predicted values with the actual 
values of current account balances as a proportion of GDP in Figure 2. One can see that actual U.S. current 
account deficits are larger in 2001-04 than what could be predicted using the pre-1995 estimation results 
whether with or without institutional variables. The magnitude of the under-prediction for the 2001-04 period is 
about 2 percentage points for either model.  
3. An East Asian Saving Glut? 
3.1 Including Institutional Factors 
In order to assess whether East Asia has been providing excess saving to the rest of the world, we augment the 
basic model in equation (1) with institutional variables suggested by the discussion in Bernanke (2005).  
Financial Openness: The openness of a country to cross-border financial transactions should affect 
capital flows, and thus the current account. One critique of the global saving glut view focuses on the question 
of timing – why does excess saving now flow to U.S. financial markets, and not in earlier periods? A common 
rejoinder is that, especially for the East Asian economies, comprehensive financial liberalization policies have 
been implemented, allowing excess saving to flow into the U.S, and other countries with developed financial 
markets.  
Our metric of financial openness is the Chinn-Ito (2006) index. This index is the first principle 
                                                 
14 Since the time fixed effects for the post-1995 time periods are not available, we use the average of the time effects for the 
1971-1995 period. This exercise allows us to observe how much the actual current account balances in the post-1995 period 
differ from what could be predicted using the relationships that obtained up to 1995. Generally, when we examine a 
subsample, the predicted values will be based on the estimation for that sample group. For example, the predicted values for 
the group of industrialized countries will be based on the estimation results from the regressions for the subsample, and the 
predictions for non-industrialized countries will be based on the estimation for ex-African LDC subsample, etc. 
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component of the binary variables pertaining to cross-border financial transactions based upon the IMF’s 
categorical enumeration reported in Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(AREAER). Higher values of this index indicate greater financial openness.15  
Legal variables: Since a key innovation in our analysis is the inclusion of legal factors, the role of these 
types of variables merits some extended discussion. As the burgeoning literature on finance and growth has 
emphasized, society’s legal foundations and institutions define the context wherein financial transactions and 
economic decisions are made. Levine, et al. (2000) find that the cross-country differences in legal and regulatory 
systems influence the development of the financial intermediary.16 The effect of legal and institutional 
development can have implications along any number of dimensions. Whether the legal system clearly 
establishes law and order, minimizes corruption, or whether the administrative branch of the government 
protects property rights efficiently are all important determinants of the incentives to save and invest. Decisions 
by foreign residents will also be affected. 
We incorporate the effect of legal and institutional development by inclusion of the variable LEGAL, 
calculated as the first principal component of law and order (LAO), corruption (CORRUPT), and bureaucracy 
quality (BQ), all drawn from the ICRG. The data series are available for the period of 1984 through 2004, but 
are included in the regression as the period-average.17 
Furthermore, we include interaction terms involving these variables because environmental factors 
might affect the way in which financial development affect saving and investment. These include interactions 
between the financial development and legal variables (PCGDP times LEGAL), interactions between the 
financial development and financial openness variables (PCGDP times KAOPEN), and interactions between 
legal development and financial openness (LEGAL times KAOPEN). The financial and legal interaction effect is 
motivated by the conjecture that deepening financial markets might lead to higher saving rates, but the effect 
                                                 
15 Greater detail about the construction of this index can be found in Chinn and Ito (2006). The data are updated to 2004 
and cover more countries (163 countries) than what can be found in Chinn and Ito. The updated data are available at 
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/. This variable is also included as the deviation from the world mean. 
16 For the analysis of legal development on financial development, see Beck and Levine (2004) and Johnson, et al. (2002) 
among others. 
17 In other words, the data on legal/institutional development are cross-sectional in nature. However, inclusion of these 




might be magnified under conditions of better developed legal institutions. Alternatively, if greater financial 
deepening leads to a lower saving rate or a lower investment rate, that effect could be mitigated when financial 
markets are equipped with highly developed legal systems. A similar argument can be applied to the effect of 
financial openness on current account balances.  
In Table 3, despite inclusion of institutional variables and their interactions, the significantly positive 
relationship between current account and government budget balances is detected in all sample groups as in the 
previous analysis.18 The point estimate on budget balances is a statistically significant unchanged, 0.15, for the 
industrialized countries group, which implies that the coefficient on the budget balance for the IDC group is 
robust to inclusion of institutional variables (Note that a ±2 standard error confidence interval encompasses 
values as high as 0.34).19 The estimated coefficients on budget balances remain close to what we found in Table 
1 the other sample groups. 
Gruber and Kamin (2005) obtain similar results in their analysis. Analyzing a smaller sample of 71 
countries over the 1982-2003 period, they find that the budget balance has a positive effect on the current 
account, with a magnitude of 0.09-0.14. Trade openness exhibits an  effect similar to what we obtain. Perhaps 
most importantly, they also find that their governance indicators (the Kaufmann et al. measure) induces a 
reduction in the current account balance.20 These findings suggest that several of the key effects we have 
detected are robust. 
We re-estimate the same regressions using each of the components of the LEGAL variables – namely, 
CORRUPT, BQ, and LAO – in order to isolate which factors drive the results. The test results (not reported) 
suggest that the (inverse) corruption index is the most significant contributor among the three institutions 
variables, followed by law and order and the bureaucracy quality index in the order of significance. When the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
variables are likely to change only very slowly. Furthermore, in order to minimize measurement errors and possible bias (as 
Wei (2000) points out in reference to the corruption indices in his paper), we think it is better to use period averages.  
18 When the F-test is conducted to test the hypothesis that the legal variable, the financial openness index, and their 
interaction terms are jointly zero, the null hypothesis is constantly rejected for all three models for the industrialized and 
less developing countries groups (marginally for the emerging market country (EMG) group). 
19 This finding is similar to the finding of Erceg et al. (2005) whose simulation results show the coefficient of the budget 
balance is around 0.20. 
20 In their analysis, they include the change in growth rate, as well as dummy variables for financial (i.e., banking) crises. 
On the other hand, they omit measures of capital account openness, financial development as well as terms of trade 
variability. They also exclude interaction effects involving legal development, thus ruling out nonlinearities of this type.  
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(inverse) corruption index is used, the estimated coefficient on the budget balance for the industrial countries 
group becomes as high as 0.24. Also, the estimated coefficient on the inverse-corruption index is negative, 
insignificantly for the IDC group and significantly for the LDC and ex-Africa LCD groups, suggesting that 
countries with lower degrees of corruption may experience capital inflows (see e.g., Wei, 2000).  
3.2 In-sample and Out-of-sample Fit 
The in-sample fit for East Asian countries is remarkably good. Japan’s current account imbalance is 
predicted almost exactly (Figure 1). As shown in Figure 3, a similar result obtains for developing East Asia ex-
China. Indeed, Korea’s current account surplus is overpredicted. And for China, the mis-prediction is only 1 
percentage point too low, and well within the 2 standard error prediction interval. 
Figure 4 shows the out-of-sample predictions for the Asian emerging market countries excluding China, 
China, and Korea, based on the models with and without the institutional variables. These figures make it clear 
that Asian emerging market countries, not just China, are experiencing an unpredictably large amount of current 
account surplus. In the 2001-04 period, the actual current account balance of China is greater than what the 
model predicts by an impressive six percentage points, while the Asian emerging market countries excluding 
China, on average, experienced better current account balances than model predictions by four percentage 
point.21 Hence, from the perspective of the data up to 1995, East Asia is running a larger current account balance 
than is to be expected. 
 
3.3 Will Financial Development Reduce “Excess Saving”? And What Is the Source of Excess Saving? 
 What do our models imply for national saving and investment? We conducted out-of-sample predictions 
for national saving and investment. For the East Asian countries ex-China, the saving rate is fairly well 
predicted. On the other hand, investment is a full two percentage points below predicted. The fact that domestic 
saving is well predicted confirms for us that the problem is not too much saving, per se, but a regional drought 
in investment. By way of contrast, U.S. national saving is badly over-predicted – by about 3 percentage point –
in the 2001-04 period. The fact that it is U.S. saving that is low (rather than investment is high) makes one 
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wonder indeed the high profitability if investment in the U.S. is what drives the global pattern of imbalances. 
We can also use our model to evaluate Bernanke’s assertion that greater financial and institutional 
development in East Asia would reduce the region’s current account surplus over the long term.22 Because our 
model allows interactions between the financial development variable (PCGDP) with other institutional 
variables (LEGAL and KAOPEN), we should be able to detect nonlinearities that might prove to be too subtle to 
identify using a straightforward linear specification. Panel A of Table 4 reports the total effect of financial 
development on current account conditional on both legal development and financial openness if the level of 
private credit creation rises by 10 percentage points relative to the world weighted average (conditional on the 
levels of LEGAL and KAOPEN ).23 Specifically, the panel for the group of industrialized countries shows that 
when an industrialized country equipped with both legal development and financial openness levels above the 
high 10 percentile (i.e., the southeast cell in the matrix) experiences a 10 percentage point increase in financial 
development measured by PCGDP (measured as the deviation from the world weighted average), its current 
account as a ratio to GDP would worsen by a 0.35 percentage points. From this panel, we can see that only 
industrialized countries with low levels of legal development would experience a current account improvement 
when their financial markets develop regardless of the levels of financial openness. Among emerging market 
countries, the effect of financial development tends to be bigger for those countries with less open capital 
accounts and lower levels of legal development. As far as the EMG group is concerned, further financial 
development would lead to current account deterioration only if a country is equipped with high levels of legal 
development or with high levels of financial openness. 
Additional insight into the results of increased financial development can be obtained by examining the 
components of the current account balance, namely national saving (the sum of private and public saving) and 
investment.  
We have also investigated the total effect on national saving and investment, respectively, conditional on 
                                                                                                                                                                       
21 Gruber and Kamin (2005) associate these current account surpluses with the after-effects of financial crises. In this sense, 
their results are equivalent to the precautionary motive for reserve accumulation identified by Aizenman and Lee (2005).  




legal development and financial openness (results reported in the working paper version). For less developed 
and emerging market countries, the effect of higher levels of financial development on national saving is smaller 
for economies with higher levels of legal development and more open financial markets. Especially, for those 
countries with underdeveloped institutional infrastructure where it can be presumed that credit constraint and 
rationing is severe, the positive impact of further financial deepening on national saving seems to be 
considerable. However, it also appears that in order for further financial deepening to lead to an increase in 
investment among developing countries through improved financial intermediation, it is better for countries to 
be equipped with better legal systems and institutions. Interestingly, Bernanke’s prediction that the more 
developed financial markets are, the less saving a country undertakes seem to be validated only by industrialized 
countries with high levels of legal development regardless of the openness of financial markets, or emerging 
market countries with high levels of legal development and financial openness. The results do seem to bolster 
Bernanke’s argument that more financial development will solve the issue of the saving glut in emerging market 
countries with high levels of both legal development and financial openness. Is this finding applicable to 
emerging market Asian countries?  
The short answer is no. Panel B of Table 4 categorizes emerging market countries in East Asia 
depending on the level of legal development and financial openness. The matrix shows that only Hong Kong 
and Singapore are categorized as countries with highest 10 percentile legal development and highest 10 
percentile financial openness, while many Asian emerging market countries are categorized in the groups with 
the middle or lower level of legal development and financial openness.  
In terms of the effect on the current account all countries except for Indonesia and the Philippines will 
experience worsening of net saving as a result of further financial deepening because the magnitude of the effect 
on investment exceeds that on national saving. China experienced an amazing 32.4 percentage point increase in 
private credit creation (net of change in the world weighted average) between 1996 and 2004. This financial 
development alone led to an increase in national saving by 1.7 percentage points, but also an increase in 
                                                                                                                                                                       
23 Between the 1991-95 and 2001-04 time periods, the (five-year average of relative) PCGDP level increased by 20.6 
percentage points for industrialized countries, 3.7 percentage points for less developed countries, 8.2 percentage points for 
Asian emerging market countries, and remarkable 32.4 percentage points for China. 
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investment by 2.4 percentage point, suggesting a negative effect of financial development on net saving, 
operating not through a reduction in saving, but through a higher increase in investment than that in saving.  
4 Robustness Checks 
4.1 Alternative Measures of Financial Development 
We have used private credit creation as the measure of financial development motivated primarily by 
expediency. However, as Beck, et al. (2001) and Levine (2005) discuss, private credit creation represents only 
one aspect of financial development. Moreover, given the size of current global imbalances, it is likely that 
capital flows are influenced not only by the level of banking system development, but also by that of securities 
markets. Hence, as a first step of robustness checks, we construct composite indexes that incorporate other types 
of financial development and re-estimate the regressions using the indexes instead of PCGDP. 
We test three composite indexes of financial development. The first one (FD1) is the first principle 
component of private credit creation (PCGDP), stock market capitalization (SMKC), stock market total value 
(SMTV); the second one (FD2) of PCGDP, SMKC, SMTV, private bond market capitalization (PVBM), and 
public bond market capitalization (PBBM) – both as ratios to GDP; the third one (FD3) of SMKC, SMTV, PVBM, 
and PBBM. We repeat the previous exercise using one of the three composite indexes in place of PCGDP 
(including interactions).24 
In order to conserve space, we summarize the results and our observations. For the most part, the signs 
of the estimated coefficients on financial development and its interactions remain unchanged regardless of the 
choice of composite index. Moreover, across the three composite indices, the index and its interaction terms 
remain significant – or become more significant – for the industrialized emerging market country groups, and 
particularly for the saving regressions. The generalization we made about the effect of financial development on 
national saving – the less open financial markets are and the lower levels of legal/institutional development they 
are equipped with, the larger the effect of financial development in emerging market countries – remains 
unaffected, regardless of the type of the composite indices. However, this generalization for investment is 
                                                 
24 Because stock market development-related variables are available after 1976, the sample size is affected. PVBM and 




confirmed only when FD1 is used, especially for the IDC group but not so much for the LDC and EMG groups. 
Generally, the results from the investment regressions with the composite indexes are not as robust as the 
original regressions. Lastly, for the IDC group, the results for the current account regressions are consistent with 
or even more significant than those with PCGDP, though that is not the case for the LDC or EMG group partly 
because of the weak performance of the investment regressions. 
4.2 Endogeneity of Financial Development 
Saving and investment could plausibly affect financial development, instead of interacting concurrently 
with institutions. To examine this reverse flow of causality, we conduct 2SLS analysis by instrumenting 
PCGDP with the LEGAL variable, financial openness, the rate of inflation, dummies for legal origins (British, 
French, German, and Scandinavian), and regional dummies.25,26  
The results from these regressions (not reported), the estimated coefficient on PCGDP is significantly 
positive for industrial countries in the current account regressions, and for all subsamples in both the national 
saving and investment regressions, all with larger coefficient magnitude and statistical significance. These 
findings are not directly comparable with what we found in Table 1 or 3 because of the differences in the model 
settings, but they do suggest that a country equipped with higher levels of legal development and financial 
openness can develop its financial markets and raise both the saving and investment rates, another finding 
inconsistent with Bernanke’s conjecture. 
4.3 A “Magnification Effect”? 
Last, we also examine the notion that financial development can function as a magnifier for the effect of other 
saving-investment determinants, especially budget balances. The idea is that a country with highly developed 
financial markets may find its budget constraint relaxed because its highly developed financial markets make it 
                                                                                                                                                                       
countries). The changes in the sample size affect the magnitude and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients, but 
interestingly, the goodness of fit remained unaffected across different regressions. 
25 As was in the previous analysis, all instruments were included as five year averages of the deviations from world 
weighted averages. Also, the instruments found to be insignificant in the first stage regressions were dropped. 
26 The choice of instruments is based on the past literature. Levine et al. (2000) find a positive link between the level of 
legal and regulatory infrastructure and that of financial intermediary development. Chinn and Ito (2006) find that financial 
openness leads to financial development especially when a country is equipped with developed legal systems and 
institutions. Boyd, et al. (2001) show that inflation significantly negatively affect both the banking sector development and 
equity market activity. La Porta, et al. (1998) demonstrate that the national legal origin (whether English, French, German, 
or Scandinavian) strongly explains cross-country differences in financial development. 
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easier for the government to finance its budget.27 We examine the magnifying role of financial development by 
interacting the financial development variable with budget balances. The interaction term between financial 
development and budget balances was not found to be significant for any of the regressions and subsamples. We 
have investigated other ways of uncovering a magnification effect, without success. However, we freely admit 
that the data might not be sufficiently informative to allow us to discern such an effect. 
5 Concluding remarks 
We have investigated the medium-term determinants of the current account using a model that controls 
for institutional factors with an aim to informing the recent debate over the sources of, and solutions to, the 
“global saving glut” that has thus far lacked empirical content. Our study addresses that gap. Given our 
motivation, we focused our study on the behavior of current account balances for the United States and 
emerging market countries in East Asia. 
We confirm the results obtained by Chinn and Prasad (2003) that – for the industrialized countries – 
budget balances play an important role in the determination of current account balances. A one percentage point 
increase in the budget balance is found to raise the current account balance by 0.15 percentage point. While 
smaller than the coefficient implied by some macro models, the standard errors on the point estimate are 
sufficiently large so that one cannot rule out a coefficient as high as 0.40 at conventional significance levels. 
This result is supported by a sensitivity analysis that suggest that a one percent point increase in the budget 
balance could lead to a 0.1 to 0.5 percentage point increase in the current account balances. We also find 
evidence for a similar effect among less developed countries. This finding is robust to inclusion of institutional 
variables, although the inclusion of financial factors seems to matter more – in a statistical sense – for 
industrialized countries than LDCs. Furthermore, we find evidence that the oft-claimed argument about the 
effect of financial and legal development as well as financial liberalization is only applicable to this group of 
countries. This finding suggests that the recommendations for financial development as a solution to the global 
saving glut have only a tenuous empirical basis.  
                                                 
27 We thank the referee for pointing out this aspect of financial development. The idea of financial development as the 
magnifier could be applied to other determinants. However, since it is not the main focus of this paper, we reserve 
examination of other interaction effects for future research. 
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We also found that saving per se is not excessive among the East Asian emerging market countries. 
Rather, these countries have experienced a shortfall in investment. The United States, on the other hand, is 
experiencing saving drought, driven by developments in the public sector. We have not discussed at length the 
sources for our mis-predictions. However, in research we have conducted elsewhere, industrial country current 
account behavior seems be related with equity and housing market development, especially since the end of the 
1990’s. Based on those results, the more pronounced a country’s asset market boom, the more likely that 
country is to experience a deterioration of its current account. Since these booms were temporary, policies to 
spur similar booms in East Asian countries would not provide a durable solution to challenge posed by global 
imbalances. 
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The data used in this paper were drawn from a number of different sources. We provide below a listing of the 
mnemonics for the variables used in the analysis, descriptions of these variables and the source(s) from which 
the primary data for constructing these variables were taken. A listing of the countries in the final sample, along 
with the country groupings used in the analysis, is provided in the working paper version of this paper. For most 
countries, data were available from 1971 through 2004. Taiwanese data are drawn from the Central Bank of 
China, International Center for the Study of East Asian Development (ICSEAD), and Asian Development Bank, 
Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries. 
Mnemonic Source*  Variable description 
CAGDP WDI   Current account to GDP ratio 
NSGDP WDI   National saving to GDP ratio 
KFGDP WDI   Capital formation to GDP ratio 
GOVBGDP WDI, IFS  General government budget balance, ratio to GDP 
NFAGDP LM   Stock of net foreign assets, ratio to GDP 
RELY  WDI   Relative per capita income, adjusted by PPP exchange rates, Measured 
   relative  to the U.S., range (0 to 1) 
RELDEPY WDI   Youth dependency ratio (relative to mean across all countries), 
 Population under 15 / Population between 15 and 65 
RELDEPO WDI   Old dependency ratio (relative to mean across all countries), Population 
 over 65 / Population between 15 and 65 
YGRAVG WDI   Average real GDP growth 
YGRSD WDI   Standard deviation of GDP growth 
TOTSD WDI   Standard deviation of terms of trade 
OPEN  WDI   Openness indicator: ratio of exports plus imports of goods and 
 nonfactor services to GDP 
PCGDP BDL   Banking development, ratio of private credit to GDP 
SMTV  BDL   Equity market development, stock market total value as a ratio to GDP 
SMTO  BDL   Equity market development, stock market turnover 
K2  GM, AREAER  Capital controls on current account transactions 
K3  GM, AREAER  Capital controls on capital account transactions 
KAOPEN** CI   Capital account openness 
BQ  ICRG   Quality of Bureaucracy 
LAO  ICRG   Law and order 
CORRUPT ICRG   Corruption index 
LEGAL** authors’ calculations General level of legal development, first principal component of BQ, 
 LAO, and CORRUPT. 
LEFT  DPI2004  Dummy for left-wing government  
PLURAL DPI2004  Dummy for countries with plural political systems 
MILEXP SIPRI   Defense spending (as a ratio to GDP) 
POLCONV Henisz   Political Constraint (democracy) Index 
SDTAXREV authors’ calculations Standard deviation of tax revenues 
POLITY Polity IV  Polity (democracy) score  
U  WDI   Unemployment rate 
  
* These are mnemonics for the sources used to construct the corresponding. BDL: Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and 
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Levine (2001, updated in following years); CI: Chinn and Ito (2006); DPI2004: Database of Political Institutions, 
Beck et al. (2001 and updated); GM: Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (1998); Henisz: Henisz (2000); ICRG: 
International Country Risk Guide; IFS: IMF’s International Financial Statistics; IMF: Other IMF databases; 
LM: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006); Polity IV: Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002, updated in 
2004); SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2005), and WDI: World Development 
Indicators (2006). 
** In the original series, KAOPEN and LEGAL series range between negative and positive values since they are 
the first principal components. However, in order to avoid the complexity of interpreting the estimated 
coefficients, these variables are adjusted such that the minimum value is zero, i.e., they range between zero and 
some positive value.  
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Figure 1: In-Sample Predicted Current Account Balances  
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Figure 2: Out-of-Sample Predictions of Current Account Balances 
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Figure 3: In-Sample Predicted Current Account Balances  
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Figure 4: Out-of-Sample Predicted  Current Account Balances  
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Table 1: Current Account Regressions 












Government budget balance 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.242 
 [0.068]** [0.086]* [0.081]* [0.092]*** 
Net foreign assets (initial) 0.049 0.063 0.047 0.05 
 [0.005]*** [0.011]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** 
Relative income 0.027 0.059 0.032 0.09 
 [0.019] [0.025]** [0.085] [0.090] 
Relative income squared 0.016 -0.212 0.008 0.118 
 [0.029] [0.080]*** [0.096] [0.105] 
Dependency ratio (young) -0.06 0.021 -0.071 -0.075 
 [0.020]*** [0.073] [0.025]*** [0.025]*** 
Dependency ratio (old) -0.205 0.001 -0.313 -0.241 
 [0.061]*** [0.081] [0.093]*** [0.098]** 
Financial deepening (PCGDP) 0.001 -0.006 0.005 0.013 
 [0.008] [0.010] [0.013] [0.014] 
TOT volatility -0.013 0.063 -0.017 -0.006 
 [0.019] [0.058] [0.020] [0.018] 
Avg. GDP growth -0.151 -0.101 -0.161 -0.145 
 [0.141] [0.207] [0.155] [0.117] 
Trade openness 0.003 0.037 -0.003 -0.008 
 [0.009] [0.011]*** [0.010] [0.011] 
Oil exporting countries 0.046 – 0.047 0.039 
 [0.013]*** – [0.013]*** [0.011]*** 
Observations 502 132 370 235 
Adjusted R-squared  0.42 0.50 0.39 0.53 
All the variables to be included in the estimation, except for net foreign assets to GDP, are converted 
into the deviations from the GDP-weighted world mean before being calculated into the five year 
averages. Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 




Table 2: Estimated coefficients on the government budget balance (% of GDP)  
in the current account regressions 
Model Specifications Estimated Coefficient 
w/ five-year average data  
(1) Fixed Effects 0.377*** 
(2) 2SLS – IV w/out institutional vars 0.325** 
(3) 2SLS – IV w/ institutional vars 0.448* 
w/ HP-filtered annual data  
(4) HP – OLS w/out institutional vars 0.125*** 
(5) HP – OLS w/ institutional vars 0.095** 
(6) HP – Fixed Effects 0.485*** 
(7) HP – GLS w/out inst. vars 0.375*** 
(8) HP – GLS w/ inst. vars 0.326*** 
NOTES: Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
(1) “Fixed Effects” refers to the fixed effects model applied to the five-year panel data. (2) “2SLS – IV 
w/out institutional vars” refers to the 2SLS model applied to the five-year panel data, instrumented with 
the instrumental variables of the dummy for the left-wing government (LEFT) from the World Bank’s 
Database of Political Institutions (DPI 2004); military spending as a ratio to GDP (MILEXP) from the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); yearly changes in unemployment rates (D_U); 
and regional dummies, but does not include “institutional variables” mentioned in the text.  (3) “2SLS – 
IV w/ institutional vars” is a five-year panel model instrumented with the same IVs, but does include the 
institutional variables.  (4) “HP – OLS w/out institutional vars” refers to the OLS model applied to a set 
of RHS variables that include variables detrended with HP-filter, but does not include institutional 
variables.  (5) “HP – OLS w/ institutional vars” refers to the OLS model applied to a set of RHS variables 
that include variables detrended with HP-filter.  (6) “HP – Fixed Effects” refers to the fixed effects  model 
applied to a set of RHS variables that include variables annual HP-filtered data, but not institutional and 
interaction terms. (7) “HP – GLS w/out inst. vars” refers to the GLS model applied to a set of RHS 
variables that include HP-filtered variables, but no institutional variables and interaction terms. (8) “HP – 
GLS w/ inst. vars” refers to the GLS model applied to a set of RHS variables that include HP-filtered 





Table 3: Current Account Regression with Institutional Variables 









w/out Africa EMG 
Government budget balance 0.154 0.168 0.251 0.23 
 [0.095]* [0.079]** [0.091]*** [0.075]*** 
Net foreign assets (initial) 0.069 0.047 0.051 0.041 
 [0.011]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.009]*** 
Relative income 0.058 0.115 0.16 0.216 
 [0.028]** [0.096] [0.106] [0.103]** 
Relative income squared -0.097 0.057 0.157 0.166 
 [0.120] [0.102] [0.121] [0.111] 
Dependency ratio (young) -0.027 -0.076 -0.099 -0.044 
 [0.082] [0.022]*** [0.030]*** [0.023]* 
Dependency ratio (old) 0.099 -0.368 -0.331 -0.529 
 [0.098] [0.096]*** [0.114]*** [0.127]*** 
Financial Develop. (PCGDP) 0.01 -0.043 -0.038 -0.082 
 [0.012] [0.032] [0.040] [0.038]** 
Legal development (LEGAL) 0.002 -0.017 -0.02 -0.018 
 [0.007] [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.010]* 
PCGDP x LEGAL -0.035 -0.021 -0.025 -0.037 
 [0.015]** [0.011]* [0.012]** [0.016]** 
Financial open. (KAOPEN) -0.002 0.002 0.005 0.008 
 [0.003] [0.007] [0.008] [0.010] 
KAOPEN x LEGAL 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.005 
 [0.003]*** [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] 
KAOPEN x PCGDP 0.002 0 0.002 -0.002 
 [0.009] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009] 
TOT volatility 0.1 -0.015 -0.002 -0.003 
 [0.054]* [0.018] [0.019] [0.022] 
Avg. GDP growth -0.036 -0.09 -0.107 -0.132 
 [0.243] [0.096] [0.124] [0.118] 
Trade openness 0.046 0.005 0 0.004 
 [0.014]*** [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] 
Oil exporting countries – 0.04 0.035 0.025 
 – [0.013]*** [0.012]*** [0.013]* 
Observations 126 345 234 203 
Adjusted R-squared  0.55 0.46 0.54 0.51 
All the variables to be included in the estimation, except for net foreign assets to GDP, are converted 
into the deviations from the GDP-weighted world mean before being calculated into the five year 
averages. Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 




Table 4: Total Effects of a 10% increase in Financial Development (PCGDP) 
conditional on legal development and financial openness
 
A. Current Account 
KAOPEN [0, 4.38] 









10 percentile (4.37) 0.365 0.379 0.382 
Mean  




10 percentile (6.47) -0.370 -0.357 -0.354 
 
KAOPEN [0, 4.38] 









10 percentile (1.15) 0.408 0.408 0.408 
Mean  




10 percentile (3.89) -0.167 -0.167 -0.167 
 
KAOPEN [0, 4.38] 











10 percentile (1.66) 0.528 0.503 0.462 
Mean  




10 percentile (4.50) -0.523 -0.548 -0.589 
 
 
B: Matrix for Emerging Asia  
KAOPEN  
Low  
10 percentile 
(0.66) 
Mean  
(1.90) 
High  
10 percentile 
(3.96) 
Low 
10 percentile 
(1.66) 
Bangladesh
Indonesia, 
Philippines, 
Sri Lanka 
 
Mean  
(2.93) China 
India, Korea, 
Malaysia, 
Thailand, 
ex-China EA
 LEGAL 
High 
10 percentile 
(4.50) 
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